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Abstract 
 
Developing banking standards is an important process for a country’s financial and economic 
well being. Their importance incites governments to insure the stability and the good 
performance of their banking systems. Accordingly, several researchers pay a particular 
attention to banking governance. Specifically, shareholders-managers’ convergence of 
interests and the possible repercussions of these on the performance of banks can be avoided 
only by implementing a solid system of governance. The main purpose of this article is to 
determine the impact of governance on the performance of banks, through an empirical study 
of a sample of 10 Tunisian banks during the period 1997-2007. Our empirical investigation 
shows a positive association between external administrators and performance. It is worth 
noting that a high number of administrators results in a negative effect on performance. The 
results also reveal that managers lack control while the board of directors seems to exert a lot 
of power. This state of affairs results from the fact of associating the role of the manager with 
that of the board of directors. Finally, our results reveal a negative association between the 
presence of a group of dominant shareholders and performance, a phenomenon which might 
be explained in terms of private appropriation of benefits.  
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